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We analyze the performance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols where the entangled
source originates not from one of the trusted parties, Alice or Bob, but from the malicious eavesdropper in the
middle. This is in contrast to the typical simulations where Alice creates the entangled source and sends it
over an insecure quantum channel to Bob. By using previous techniques and identifying certain error correction
protocol equivalences, we show that Alice and Bob do not need to trust their source, and can still generate a
positive key rate. Such a situation can occur in a quantum network where the untrusted source originated in
between the two users.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.-p
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] provides a way for
two people, Alice and Bob, to communicate secretly over an
insecure quantum channel. The continuous-variable version
of QKD [2] provides an exciting alternative to the original
discrete-variable schemes. Continuous variables offer higher
detection efficiencies, off-the-shelf lasers for sources, and the
potential to be conveniently integrated into current telecom-
munication systems. Theoretically, the use of Gaussian re-
sources, operations, and measurements, offer a simple way of
analyzing the security of such protocols.
Significant progress has been made in continuous-variable
QKD over the years [2]. More recent results include,
the first experimental demonstration of entanglement-based
continuous-variable QKD [3], as well as finite-size key ef-
fects with composability using squeezed states [4], and im-
proved higher efficiency error correcting codes [5]. In the
performance analysis of continuous-variable QKD protocols
thus far, it is the typical assumption that the source of the
QKD protocol is created by one of the honest parties, e.g.,
Alice, and independent of the eavesdropper, Eve. However,
having Eve being the source of the entanglement has long
been a staple of theoretical discrete-variable QKD [6], espe-
cially with respect to security proofs [1, 7–10], and practical
demonstrations [11–13]. On the other hand, explicitly cal-
culating the secret key rates in such a situation has not been
considered in continuous-variable QKD, even though bene-
fits such as higher tolerance to loss have been observed in
discrete-variable QKD [11, 12].
In this paper, we ask the question: “does having the en-
tangled source originating from the middle, improve the per-
formance of continuous-variable QKD protocols as it does in
certain discrete-variable protocols?”. Hence, we consider the
continuous-variable situation where Eve is placed in the mid-
dle between Alice and Bob, and is given full control of the
creation of the Gaussian entangled resource. Using previous
analytical techniques (e.g., see [14]), we show that in such
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a situation, a secure key can still be generated between Al-
ice and Bob. Furthermore, our analysis uncovers the relation-
ships and equivalences between the error correction protocols,
direct [15] and reverse reconciliation [16]. For example, di-
rect reconciliation using coherent states and homodyne detec-
tion is shown to be equivalent to reverse reconciliation using
squeezed states and heterodyne detection when the entangle-
ment is placed in the middle. In such a situation, from one
perspective, direct reconciliation is improved and can beat the
3 dB loss limit, while from another, it is simply a worse off
version of reverse reconciliation (e.g., reverse reconciliation
with excess channel noise). This highlights the differences
between discrete and continuous-variable QKD, particularly
in how loss on the channel affects each of them.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we describe
the entanglement in the middle scheme followed by the equiv-
alences of the error correcting protocols in Sec. III. In Sec. IV,
we derive the secret key rates of various protocols where the
entanglement originated from Eve in the middle. We follow
this with a discussion of our results in Sec. V and offer con-
cluding remarks in Sec. VI.
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FIG. 1: Schematic of a continuous-variable QKD protocol where the
entangled source of variance V (potentially created by Eve) is placed
in the middle between Alice and Bob. Eve’s attack consists of two
entangling cloner attacks on either side of the source (see text for
further details). Alice and Bob can either perform homodyne or het-
erodyne detection, using either direct or reverse reconciliation. Note
that the usual situation of a trusted source (i.e., a source originating
from Alice’s station) can simply be recovered by setting T1 = 1.
2II. ENTANGLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE
We begin by first describing the entanglement in the mid-
dle scheme. An entangled Gaussian resource is placed in the
middle between Alice and Bob, see Fig. 1. This resource is to
be used by Alice and Bob to generate a secure key which can
then be used to encrypt data [1]. In principle, this resource
could have been created by some third party, say Charlie, in
installing an entangled source between two users in a quan-
tum network. However, it is better to err on the side of cau-
tion and assume that Eve could have also created this entan-
gled state. We also assume that this entangled source is Gaus-
sian. This is because the source is usually a Gaussian state and
can thus maximize the Shannon mutual information and from
an eavesdropping point of view, a Gaussian attack maximizes
the eavesdropper’s extractable information [17, 18]. In her
attack, Eve perfectly replaces the quantum channel between
Alice and Bob with her own quantum channel where the loss
is simulated by two separate beam splitters with transmissions
T1 and T2, where Ti ∈ [0, 1]. When these two transmissions
are symmetric, i.e., T1 = T2, we say that the entanglement is
in the middle of Alice and Bob.
Eve’s EPR state has two entangled modes described in the
Heisenberg picture as Xˆepr1 (sent to Alice) and Xˆepr2 (sent
to Bob). Such a state is created by combining two orthogonal
squeezed states, Xˆs1 and Xˆs2, on a 50/50 beam splitter. i.e.,
Xˆepr1 = (Xˆs1 + Xˆs2)/
√
2, (1)
Xˆepr2 = (Xˆs1 − Xˆs2)/
√
2.
Also V is the symmetrized variance of each of the two en-
tangled modes, i.e., V := V (Xˆepr1) = V (Xˆepr2). We also
assume Eve’s attack is perfect, i.e., no unknown noise on her
input and output states. Note that when T1 = 1 we can re-
cover the usual QKD situation where Alice creates the entan-
gled state safely at her station. For each of these beam split-
ters, Eve performs a collective Gaussian attack [17–19]. We
assume Eve uses such an attack in our new protocol, because
it was shown, up to a suitable symmetrization of the protocols,
that this type of attack is the best attack allowed by the laws of
quantum physics for standard direct and reverse reconciliation
protocols [20]. It consists in Eve interacting her independent
ancilla modes with Alice and Bob’s resultant modes for each
run of the protocol in such a way to generate a memoryless
Gaussian channel.
The most common example of a collective Gaussian attack
is the entangling cloner [21]. This consists in Eve prepar-
ing (for each of the two beam splitter attacks) ancilla modes
XˆE and Xˆ ′′E from an entangled Gaussian state with variance
W . Eve keeps one mode Xˆ ′′E and injects the other mode XˆE
into the unused port of the beam splitter, leading to the out-
put mode Xˆ ′E . These operations are repeated identically and
independently for each of the signal modes sent out to Alice
and Bob. Eve’s output modes are then stored in a quantum
computer and detected collectively at the end of the proto-
col. Eve’s final measurement is optimized based on Alice and
Bob’s classical communications.
Finally, we note that in continuous-variable QKD, in order
for Alice and Bob to perform their quadrature measurements
via homodyne or heterodyne detection, they need a reference
pulse known as a local oscillator. This allows them to cor-
rectly measure a quadrature with respect to the other orthog-
onal quadrature. However, the local oscillator can be simply
thought of as a classical signal and can therefore be considered
an authenticated classical signal [22]. So in principal, when
the source originates from the middle, Alice can first create a
local oscillator and send it onto Bob.
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FIG. 2: An example of a family of eight protocols [23] in continuous-
variable QKD. Alice can choose between two states to send to Bob,
who can in turn choose between two types of measurements. Finally
there are two one-way error correction protocols Alice and Bob can
use.
III. EQUIVALENCES BETWEEN DIRECT AND REVERSE
RECONCILIATION
The first result of this paper is to show that a number of
equivalences occur between the error correction protocols di-
rect reconciliation [15] and reverse reconciliation [16], when
entanglement is placed in the middle. To understand this, it is
first helpful to understand how the entanglement-based picture
works in continuous variables [14]. Suppose Alice and Bob
share an entangled bi-partite Gaussian state. Then if Alice
performs homodyne detection (and therefore gets one mea-
surement result, q or p) on her half of the EPR pair then Bob’s
half collapses to a squeezed state. On the other hand, if Alice
performs heterodyne detection (and thus gets two measure-
ment results, q and p), Bob’s mode collapses to a coherent
state. So in the prepare-and-measure scheme, it is as though
Alice had initially sent Bob a randomly displaced squeezed
(coherent) state, respectively. As for the reconciliation pro-
tocols, when we talk about direct (reverse) reconciliation it
means that Bob (Alice) is trying to estimate what Alice (Bob)
has measured. Hence, in direct (reverse) reconciliation Alice
(Bob) is the reference point. In total then, with the state prepa-
ration, detection and error correction, we end up with a family
of eight protocols [23], i.e., one could choose either squeezed
or coherent states with either direct or reverse reconciliation
using either homodyne or heterodyne detection (cf. Fig. 2).
We naturally find certain equivalences between the eight
protocols, when entanglement is in the middle, based on the
type of measurement Alice and Bob perform. To work out
the equivalences simply determine the number of measure-
ment outcomes Alice and Bob get for each run of the protocol,
e.g., if both perform homodyne each will have one measure-
ment outcome, whereas with heterodyne detection both will
3have two. If they each have the same number of measure-
ment outcomes, then direct and reverse reconciliation proto-
cols will be the same. For example, if the total number of
measurements for each are two, meaning Alice prepared co-
herent states and Bob performed heterodyne detection, then it
really doesn’t matter who we label as Alice and who we label
as Bob. The protocol becomes symmetric as they both have
two measurement outcomes, and hence who is the reference
point is arbitrary and so, direct reconciliation equals reverse
reconciliation.
The explicit equivalences between the protocols, when en-
tanglement is placed in the middle, are as follows:
• Coherent states and homodyne with direct (reverse) is
the same as squeezed states and heterodyne with reverse
(direct).
• Direct and reverse reconciliation are equivalent for
squeezed states and homodyne and also for coherent
states and heterodyne.
In this paper, we show that out of the family of eight pro-
tocols in total, coherent states and homodyne with direct, or
equivalently, squeezed state and heterodyne with reverse, out-
perform all other protocols when the source is placed in the
middle. We will now calculate the secret key rates for the var-
ious protocols using previously established techniques, e.g.,
see [14].
IV. SECRET KEY RATES
We will limit our calculations to direct reconciliation, as
the calculations for reverse reconciliation can be automati-
cally derived through the previously mentioned equivalences.
The secret key rate for direct reconciliation is defined as
K = S(A : B)− S(A : E), (2)
where S(A : B) and S(A : E) = S(E)−S(E|A) are the mu-
tual informations between Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve,
respectively. We now go about calculating these quantities
for the cases of Alice creating squeezed states and coherent
states with Bob using either homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tion [24]. For more details of these calculations involving cor-
relation matrices and symplectic spectra see [2, 14]. Note also
that we assume Alice and Bob have perfect (100 % efficient)
homodyne and heterodyne detectors. First we write Alice and
Bob’s covariance matrix [2], which is given by
γAB =
(
aI cZ
cZ bI
)
, (3)
where I and Z are the usual Pauli matrices and a = T1V +(1−
T1)W1, b = T2V +(1−T2)W2, and c =
√
T1
√
T2
√
V 2 − 1.
This seemingly innocuous matrix will form the basis for most
of our calculations. In fact, it is this matrix which takes into
account Eve being in the middle (along with the requirements
of the effective channel, T = T1T2, which will be used when
plotting), because typically a = V .
Note that the value T can be calculated by allowing an ar-
bitrary mode Xˆ1 to go through two different beam splitters
one after the other. For example, after the first beam splitter
we have Xˆ2 =
√
T1Xˆ1 +
√
1− T1Nˆ1 and after the second
beam splitter Xˆ3 =
√
T2Xˆ2+
√
1− T2Nˆ2. Back substituting
and calculating the variances, gives the final required relation,
T = T1T2, where Nˆi are the noise terms from the unused port
of the beam splitters.
A. Squeezed states
Alice and Bob’s mutual information, for squeezed
states [25, 26] with homodyne detection, is given by
1
2
log2(VA/VA|B), i.e.,
S(A : B) =
1
2
log
2
( a
a− c2/b
)
, (4)
for heterodyne is given by
S(A : B) =
1
2
log2
( a
a− c2/(b+ 1)
)
. (5)
We will now calculate Eve’s mutual information with Bob,
S(A : E) = S(E) − S(E|A), which is exactly the same for
both homodyne and heterodyne detection. This is because, as
we are using direct reconciliation, it is conditioned on Alice’s
measurement results and not Bob’s. This simplification illus-
trates the beauty of the entanglement-based scheme. Note that
because Eve provides a purification of Alice and Bob’s den-
sity matrix we can write S(E) = S(AB). Therefore, we have
S(AB) = G[(λ1 − 1)/2] +G[(λ2 − 1)/2] where
G(x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2 x, (6)
and where the symplectic eigenvalues are given by
λ21,2 =
1
2
[∆±
√
∆2 − 4D2], (7)
where ∆ = a2 + b2 + c2 and D = ab − c2 [2, 14]. Again
using the same purification argument we can write S(E|A) =
S(B|A). Again to calculate S(B|A) we calculate Bob’s cor-
relation matrix conditioned on Alice’s measurement outcome
xa which is calculated using [2]
γxaB = γB − σTAB(XγAX)−1σAB , (8)
where the inverse is a pseudoinverse and the matrix X =
[1, 0; 0, 0]. We find that S(B|A) = G[(λ3 − 1)/2] where
λ23 = b(b−c2/a). We now have enough information to numer-
ically calculate and plot the secret key rate given in Eq. (2), but
first we calculate the coherent state case.
B. Coherent states
Alice and Bob’s mutual information, for coherent states
with homodyne detection, is given by
S(A : B) =
1
2
log
2
( a+ 1
a+ 1− c2/b
)
, (9)
4and for heterodyne detection it is
S(A : B) = log2
( b+ 1
b + 1− c2/(a+ 1)
)
. (10)
As before, the next step is to calculate Eve’s mutual informa-
tion with Alice. Now in the previous case of squeezed states,
we only needed to calculate one expression for Eve’s mutual
information with Alice which could then be used for both the
homodyne and heterodyne detection cases. However, this is
not possible in the case of coherent states, as Alice’s measure-
ment is different depending on whether Bob does homodyne
or heterodyne detection. This is because Alice discards one
of her measurement results during the sifting phase of homo-
dyne and keeps both during heterodyne. Therefore two sepa-
rate calculations needs to be performed. Firstly, the homodyne
detection case. To create a coherent state, Alice performs het-
erodyne detection on her mode using a 50/50 beam splitter
(BS) which introduces vacuum noise denoted by system C.
This interaction on the initial correlation matrix γA0C0B can
be described by the following symplectic transformation [2]
γACB = [S
BS
AC ⊗ IB ]TγA0C0B[SBSAC ⊗ IB]. Using the previ-
ous purification arguments, we find that S(E|A) = S(BC|A)
as, after Alice’s measurement, the system BCE is pure. The
correlation matrix of the system BC conditioned on Alice’s
measurement result is calculated to be
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FIG. 3: Plot of direct reconciliation using homodyne detection with
(a) coherent states and (b) squeezed states. Solid (red) line: entan-
glement in the middle; Dashed (blue) line: entanglement at Alice’s
station. By giving Eve control of the entangled source and by plac-
ing it in the middle of Alice and Bob we are still able to generate a
secure key. Due to the equivalences in the error correction protocols,
this entanglement in the middle scenario can be seen as a direct rec-
onciliation protocol beating the 3 dB loss limit using coherent states
or alternatively, a reverse reconciliation protocol with excess channel
noise.
γxaBC =


b− c2/(a+ 1) 0 √2c/(a+ 1) 0
0 b 0 −c/√2√
2c/(a+ 1) 0 2a/(a+ 1) 0
0 −c/√2 0 (a+ 1)/2

 .
The conditional von Neumann entropy can be written as
S(BC|A) = G[(λ3 − 1)/2] +G[(λ4 − 1)/2] where
λ2
3,4 =
1
2
[A±
√
A2 − 4B], (11)
with A = (a+ bD+∆)/(a+1) and B = D(b+D)/(a+1)
with D and ∆ defined previously.
We now calculate Eve’s mutual information in the case
of Bob performing heterodyne detection. Using γxa,paB =
γB − C(XγACX)−1CT gives γxaBC = [b − c2/(a + 1)]I.
The conditional von Neumann entropy is given by S(E|A) =
S(B|A) = G[(λ3−1)/2] where λ3 = b−c2/(a+1). We can
now calculate the final secret key rate for the coherent state
protocols and plot them with the squeezed states protocols.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Using the previous section’s results we can plot the secret
key rates for the various protocols over a lossy channel. We
find that out of the family of eight protocols in total, coherent
states and homodyne with direct, or equivalently, squeezed
state and heterodyne with reverse, outperform all other proto-
cols when the source is placed in the middle. In Fig. 3, we
plot the cases of homodyne detection for (a) coherent states
and (b) squeezed states where the dashed lines indicate the
usual case where Alice controls the entangled source, while
the solid lines indicate the entanglement in the middle situa-
tion. We can see that in both the coherent state and squeezed
state cases, even though Eve controls the source, both proto-
cols are still secure. We also notice that the entanglement in
the middle schemes can go past the 3 dB loss limit of direct
reconciliation. In the equivalences between direct and reverse
reconciliation protocols, this can be looked at as a (coherent
state) direct reconciliation protocol beating the 3 dB loss limit
or, alternatively, a (squeeze state) reverse reconciliation proto-
col performing poorly, i.e., with (equivalent) additional excess
channel noise on the channel. Remember that the squeezed
state protocol using reverse reconciliation does not have a loss
limit and, for a lossy channel, is secure for all values of chan-
nel transmissions. We note that the heterodyne cases are not
plotted here but are also secure when the source originates
from Eve. Also the effect of excess noise on the quantum
channel, has the typical effect of reducing the security of the
protocol as a function of the excess noise value.
The analysis in this paper highlights the differences be-
tween discrete-variable QKD and continuous-variable QKD.
This is because in discrete variables, placing the entanglement
in the middle allows the QKD protocol to tolerate higher lev-
els of loss (in fact, the distance can be double). However, in
continuous variables, we do see an advantage in tolerance to
loss but because of the symmetry in error correction protocols,
one could look at it as another protocol performing badly. A
5kind of the glass is half full half empty scenario. Perhaps the
main difference lies in the definition of loss. In discrete vari-
ables, loss simply means the photon did not arrive and was
lost to the environment. Whereas, in continuous variables loss
means additional Gaussian noise on the quantum channel, and
are thus unable to simply postselect out the times when loss
occurs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have analyzed the performance of eight
continuous-variable QKD protocols where the source of the
protocol originates from the malicious eavesdropper who is in
the middle between Alice and Bob. This is in direct contrast
to the typical scenario where Alice usually creates the source
at her secure station. We showed that a secure key can still
be achieved even when Eve controls such a source. We also
pointed out the various error correction protocols equivalences
that occur when the entanglement is placed in the middle. In
terms of possible future research, it would be interesting to
look at the entanglement in the middle scheme from the point
of view of the postselection error correction protocol [27].
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